Abstract: This paper addresses the security issue of networked control systems (NCSs) under DoS attacks. According to the level of attacks, DoS attacks are classified into two types: weak attacks and strong attacks. A recursive networked predictive control (RNPC) method based on round-trip time delay is proposed to compensate for the adverse effects introduced by the weak DoS attacks as well as the network communication constraints, such as random delay, packet disorder and packet loss. A theoretical result using the switched system theory is also obtained for the closed-loop stability of the RNPC system. For the strong DoS attacks on the controller side, a multi-controller switching scheme is presented, in which each controller is designed based on the RNPC. The performance of the proposed strategies is demonstrated by practical experiments to control a DC motor speed through the Internet under DoS attacks.
INTRODUCTION
The use of networks in networked control systems (NCSs) offers many advantages, such as flexible architectures, low installation and maintenance costs, and the fusion and sharing of global resources. NCSs have been finding applications in mobile sensor networks, remote surgery, unmanned aerial vehicles and so on (Hespanha et al. (2007) ). However, with the opening-up property of a shared network, NCSs are generally confronted with the network security problem (Dzung et al. (2005) ; Yang et al. (2006) ; Creery and Byres (2007) ; Cárdenas et al. (2008) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ).
General IT security can be described in terms of security objectives, such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, authorization, auditability, nonrepudiability, and third-party protection (Wolframm and Adamczyk (2008) ), of which the first four ones have the highest priority for the data transmitted in industrial NCSs (Dzung et al. (2005) ; Gupta and Chow (2008) ; Cárdenas et al. (2008) ). This paper is mainly concerned with the data availability.
The violation of availability of sensor and control data is known as denial-of-service (DoS), which is perhaps the most detrimental threat to NCSs. DoS attacks can be classified into several different types, in which the packet flooding attack is prevalent. Attackers may flood a network with a large volume of data to deliberately consume the limited resources, such as CPU cycles, memory, network bandwidth, and packet buffers (Wang et al. (2007) ). Consequently, time delay and packet loss of NCS become worse under such attacks, which in turn may significantly impair the system performance.
While anomaly-detection and signature-scan techniques are commonly used to identify an ongoing attack, so far no technique is able to cope with all types of DoS attacks. To quantitatively investigate the performance degradation of NCSs under DoS attacks, a few mathematical models to analyze DoS attacks were developed, such as queueing models (Long et al. (2005) ; Wang et al. (2007) ). To respond to DoS attacks from the control viewpoint, Amin et al. (2009) studied the problem of security constrained optimal control for NCSs using a Bernoulli DoS attack model. However, in practice it is impossible to know the strategy of attackers (i.e. the model of attacks) in advance. This paper will consider DoS attacks from the perspective of their impact on NCSs, instead of their models. According to the level of DoS attacks, two different attack scenarios are considered: weak attacks and strong attacks. Weak attacks denote the situation in which DoS attacks slightly slow down the network links between the controller side and the plant side so as to cause additional time delay and packet loss. Strong attacks represent the case where DoS attacks produce the worse consequences so as to shut a networked controller off from the network. For the weak attacks, a recursive networked predictive control (RNPC) Fig. 1 . Structure of recursive networked predictive control systems approach is proposed based on the round-trip time (RTT) delay to compensate for the time delay, packet disorder and packet loss. A multi-controller switching scheme is presented to deal with the strong DoS attacks on the controller side.
RECURSIVE NETWORKED PREDICTIVE CONTROL
Due to the presence of communication constraints introduced by the network, such as random delay, packet disorder and packet loss, it is hard to design and implement NCSs. One technique recently proposed for NCSs is the networked predictive control (NPC), which has been proved to be an effective strategy to compensate for these negative effects (Liu et al. (2006) ; Hu et al. (2008) ). However, the previous NPC methods have one disadvantage: the high computational complexity resulting from the solution of Diophantine equation and the calculation of matrix inverse, especially for the system with a larger time delay.
In this paper, following the NPC method in (Chai et al. (2008) ), a recursive networked predictive control (RNPC) approach is proposed based on the RTT delay. Compared with previous results, the output and control predictions are calculated only on the controller side and the network delay compensation is based on the RTT delay, which is more feasible in practice. Whereas in (Chai et al. (2008) ), the output and control predictions were done both in the sensor and controller, which is not generally allowed due to the limited computation capacity of the sensor. In addition, the delay compensation was based on the oneway time delay in the backward and forward channels, which needs clock synchronization between the controller side and the plant side.
In this section, we present first the design details of RNPC and then the stability analysis of the closed-loop system.
Design of RNPC
As shown in Fig. 1 , the RNPC consists of a buffer, a control prediction generator (CPG), and a network delay compensator (NDC). The CPG is designed to generate a set of future control predictions based on the mathematical model of the plant . The NDC is used to compensate for the network delay, packet disorder and packet loss simultaneously. The buffer is established to hold the consecutive historical output and control input data of the plant before they are transmitted to the controller.
The following assumptions are made for the RNPC design.
Assumption 1: At each instant of time, a timestamp is sent to the controller together with the plant data. With the same timestamp, the control predictions calculated by the plant data are transmitted to the actuator.
Assumption 2:
The control prediction horizon N is chosen to be not less than the upper bound of the network RTT delay (noted by τ ), i.e., N ≥ τ .
( 1) Remark 1: In the RNPC, disordered packets are discarded under the timestamp comparison mechanism in the actuator. Accordingly, the packet disorder can be treated as part of packet loss. The lost packets are simply ignored, and the RTT delay in Assumption 2 is measured by the timestamp of those packets received by the actuator. Therefore, the packet disorder and loss do not need to be specially treated but regarded as part of the RTT delay using the compensation strategy proposed in this paper.
Consider the following single-input single-output linear plant in discrete time given by:
where y(k) and u(k) are the output and control input of the plant, d is the time delay, and A(z −1 ) and B(z −1 ) are the polynomials as follows:
Control Prediction Generator
Without considering the network delay, a controller is designed as
where
is the error between the future reference r(k + d − 1) and the output prediction y(k + d − 1|k). C(z −1 ) and D(z −1 ) are the polynomials as follows:
To simplify the formulation, the following operations are defined:
) where i is an integer, x(·) represents y(·) and u(·).
Suppose that, at time k, the sensor sends the following historical input-output data sequence to the controller through the backward channel:
Thus, the historical data sequence in the controller at time k can be described by
where τ sc k is the delay in the backward channel at time k. Equation (8) shows that the historical input-output data up to time k − τ sc k are available in the controller at time k. Based on (2) and (8), the forward output predictions of the plant are:
Then, using (8), (9) and (3), the future output predictions and control predictions can be calculated recursively as shown in (10) and (11) at the bottom of this page.
Clearly, Equation (11) yields the following control prediction sequence:
which is put into one packet together with the timestamp k − τ sc k and sent to the actuator.
Network Delay Compensator
One strategy for dealing with packet disorder is that the NDC makes a register to store previous control prediction sequences. At each sampling instant, the NDC chooses the latest available one from the register, which can be described by
is the delay for calculating the control predictions in the controller, and τ ca k is the delay in the forward channel. The RTT delay can be accurately calculated in the actuator by subtracting the timestamp of the control prediction sequence from the current time. In order to compensate for the RTT delay, the NDC selects the proper control signal from the latest control prediction sequence according to the RTT delay. Therefore, the control input applied to the plant will be
Remark 2: As discussed above, in order to identify the plant model on line and calculate the control predictions, the consecutive historical input-output data are required for the controller. However, in (Liu et al. (2006) ), only a single plant output y(k) is sent to the controller. Thus, the consecutive historical output data are hard to obtain for the controller due to the packet disorder and packet loss in the backward channel. On the other hand, in the NPC environment, the actuator only selects one from the control prediction sequence according to the random RTT delay, and the controller does not know the real control signal applied to the plant. As a result, the consecutive historical control inputs are much harder to arrange for the controller. Therefore, a buffer is used to deal with the problem in this paper. The consecutive historical data (8) up to time k − τ sc k are always available in the controller.
Stability of the Closed-Loop System
To analyze the stability, the reference input r(·) = 0. The closed-loop system can be derived as
where As the RTT delay changes randomly with τ k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ }, the system (15) is a switched system and the following stability criterion is obtained. Theorem 1. The closed-loop system (15) is stable if there exists a positive definite solution P = P T > 0 for the following linear matrix inequalities (LMIs)
Proof. Let the Lyapunov candidate be
and then its increment can be obtained as
which completes the proof.
MULTI-CONTROLLER SWITCHING SCHEME
As shown in Fig. 2 , networked controllers are placed in a spatially distributed fashion, from which a user can choose one to control his plant through the network. When a malfunction happens to the controller applied in the NCS due perhaps to many causes, such as equipment failures, human errors and communication congestion, one of other candidate controllers can be chosen to continue the experiment. The controller selection is carried out by means of automatic switching, which is orchestrated by a decision maker called a supervisor in the networked implementation board (NIB, see Section 4.1). The supervisor monitors the communication status between the NIB and the controller, and directs the switching among candidate controllers to construct a new closed-loop system when the NIB does not receive control signals from the current controller in L consecutive sampling periods. The value of L is determined according to the specific plant and network type of the NCS.
In order to achieve the automatic switching among controllers, there runs a state supervisor procedure, called a state-daemon, in each controller as shown in Fig. 2 . As shown in Fig. 3 Whether a controller responds to them or not is based on its state. If a controller is in the state of "listening", it will respond to the NIB and its state be converted into "working". The controller launches the backup control algorithm and sends the calculated control signals back to the NIB. The NIB will select the controller of which the control signals are first echoed back to it to rebuild a new closed-loop system. If the controller does not receive the plant data from the NIB in L sampling periods, it means that it is not selected by the NIB. Its state will be converted back into "listening". Whenever a fault occurs, the controller's state will be converted into "disabled".
In the multi-controller switching framework, the reference signals are given in the NIB and are transmitted to the controller together with the historical input-output data sequence (7) at each instant of time. Furthermore, with these data, the new controller can rapidly obtain the estimation of the plant parameters and force the plant output to track the desired reference, which can reduce the adverse effect of controller switching on the system performance.
PRACTICAL EXPERIMENTS

Internet-based Control System
To validate the proposed control strategies, a networked DC motor speed control system has been built over the Internet, as shown in Fig. 4 . Besides the Internet, the system mainly consists of three networked controller boards (NCBs), a networked implementation board (NIB) and a DC motor system. The NCBs are situated in different geographical locations as shown in table 1. The NIB with an IP address of 159.226.20.79 and the DC motor system are located in Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. The RTT delay between the controller side and the plant side varies from 2 to 7 steps (from 0.10 to 0.35s) according to the experimental results with the sampling period 0.05s.
The NCB and NIB have the same hardware structure. The kernel chip is Atmel's AT91RM9200, which is a costeffective and high-performance 180 MHz 32-bit microcontroller. The DC motor system consists of a DC motor and 
In practical applications, the model accuracy significantly affects the performance of RNPC systems because the control predictions are based on the model. Therefore, a recursive least square method is used in this paper for the online estimation of the plant parameters. The proportional-integral (PI) controller is designed to be
and the control prediction horizon N is chosen as 20.
Experiments under Weak DoS Attacks
Time delay and packet loss of NCSs will become worse under weak DoS attacks. To simulate their impact on NCSs, an attack simulation unit (ASU) is designed as
where o(k) is the output of the unit; θ(k) is a uniform random number; δ is the preset constant corresponding to the attack level; v(k) denotes the packets transmitted in the NCSs. At each sampling time, a random number generator produces a number θ(k). When θ(k) is greater than δ, the packet v(k) is successfully transmitted to the destination with a additional bounded random delay d k . Otherwise, the packet is lost in transit.
The NCB A in UK is the default controller applied to control the DC motor through the Internet. With additional random delay d k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and 10% additional packet loss introduced by the ASU in the backward and forward channels, respectively, the sinusoidal response is shown in Fig. 5 , which confirms that the system performance is poor under weak DoS attacks. When the RNPC approach based on (19) is used to compensate for the RTT delay introduced by both the Internet and DoS attacks, the sinusoidal responses is shown in Fig. 6 . Although, compared with the NCS without attacks (with the RTT delay of 2∼7 steps), the weak DoS attacks lead to the sharp increase of the RTT delays shown in the lower of Fig. 6 , they are still within the control prediction horizon (20 steps), and the RNPC can effectively compensate for them. 
Experiments under Strong DoS Attacks
Compared with the weak DoS attacks, the strong attacks may result in relatively longer delay and more packet loss, or even the breakdown of network communication.
In addition to the weak attacks described in Section 4.2, to simulate the strong DoS attacks to the NCB A, the NCB A is shut down at time t = 61.20s in the experiment process. Fig. 7 shows the sinusoidal response without the multi-controller switching, which indicates that the output cannot track the reference after t because the system becomes open-loop. Meanwhile, the RTT delays increase linearly and become greater than the control prediction horizon as shown in the lower of Fig. 7 . In this case, the following partial compensation strategy, instead of (14), is used in the RNPC for the open-loop stable system.
Accordingly, when the RTT delays are greater than the control prediction horizon after t, the plant output remains at a constant value determined by the last element of the latest control prediction sequence received by the actuator.
All the NCBs are designed based on the RNPC approach and the parameter identification algorithm, and the NCB B and C are in the "listening" state. The performance of the multi-controller switching strategy for dealing with the controller malfunction is shown in Fig. 8 , in which L is chosen as 30. When the NCB A becomes ill-behaved at time 60.95s, the NIB will select an "idle" controller in some sense "close" to it from the candidate ones to reconstruct a closed-loop system (the NCB B is selected in this experiment). In the process of controller switching, the RTT delays, with the maximum value of 39 steps, exceed the control prediction horizon. As a result, the RNPC based on (21) cannot completely compensate for these RTT delays, and the system performance becomes slightly worse during the controller switching. But the system returns to normal immediately as the RTT delays falls back to smaller than the control prediction horizon.
CONCLUSION
To guarantee the control system performance when suffering from DoS attacks, this paper has presented two control strategies for NCSs. For weak DoS atacks, a recursive networked predictive control approach is proposed based on the RTT delay to compensate for the additional time delay, packet disorder and packet loss caused by them. The stability theorem for the closed-loop RNPC system is obtained using the switched system theory. For the strong attacks, a RNPC-based multi-controller switching scheme is presented to recover the ill-behaved NCS. Practical experiments have also been done to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
